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A NOTE ON SOME DIVERSE MEANINGS OF
"THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND"
L.F .E. Goldie*

L
A.

THREE INTERPRETATIONS

THE PROBLEM

A number of writers on international law, including this
author, have speculated on the customary international law status
of General Assembly Resolutions as well as those of the United
Nation's subsidiary organs and other international organizations in
general. Moreover, a case law is currently evolving in decisions of
the International Court of J ustice 1 on this topic. This outpouring
of ideas and publications has been greatly augmented by debates
concerning the Declaration of Principles 2 and the Moratorium Resolution, 3 as well as on Article 29 of the United Nations Charter of
the Economic Rights and Duties of States. 4 To participate in such
a debate is not the purpose of the present article. This paper addresses itself to a largely implicit and camouflaged lexicographical
discord on the meaning of the terms "common heritage of
mankind" in Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles. 5 While this
task may seem to serve a more humble end than the broad determination of a law-making function, the prescriptive results of
• Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse
University College of Law.
1. See Advisory Opinion in the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Southwest Africa), 19711.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of
June 21) [hereinafter cited as The Namibia Case]; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974
l.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25); Western Sahara, 1975 l.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Jan. 3).
2. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and The
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970), reprinted in 10 l.L.M. 220 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as the Declaration of Principles].
3. United Nations General Assembly Deep Seabed Mining Moratorium Resolution of
December 15, 1969, G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969) [hereinafter cited as the Moratorium Resolution].
4. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See
infra text accompanying note 18.
5. "The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction ... are the common heritage of mankind." Declaration of Principles, supra note
2, art. 1.
The Declaration of Principles is frequently regarded as being in tandem with the
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precisely determining the scope and content of the obligations
cast, and of the rights assumed, may serve an equally essential, if
less seductive, exercise. Indeed, the underlying premise of this
paper is that, until the question of meaning is resolved, the act of
prescription merely sows the dragon's teeth of a war of words.
B.

THE WAR OF WORDS ("GET ANIMAL EST TRES MECHANT,
QUAND ON L'ATTAQUE, IL SE DEFEND''l 6

On December 9, 1982 a majority of the states participating in
the decade and more of negotiations which culminated at the final
ceremonies of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (the Treaty). 7 The United States refrained. Some states, including a number of those friendly to the United States (for example Australia, Brazil, Mexico and Nigeria) demanded that the
United States not proceed to mine the deep ocean floor for
manganese nodules. 8 These comments, although perhaps
disconcerting to the well-intentioned, do no more than mildly echo
the excoriating remarks hurled at the 1980 Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
held in Geneva. At the Plenary Debate on "The USA Unilateral
Seabed Mining Legislation," the United States was energetically
denounced 9 for enacting the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Moratorium Resolution, supra note 3. The operative part of the Moratorium Resolution
states that the General Assembly of the United Nations:
Declares that, pending the establishment of the aforementioned international
regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities
of exploitation of the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and the
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized.
6. P.K. THEODORE, LA MENAGERIE (1868). (This animal is very mean, when attacked,
it defends itself.)
7. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982).
8. For example, Chief R.O.A. Akinjide Lan, A.G. of Nigeria and Chairman of the
Nigerian Delegation to the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference at Montego Bay,
Jamaica, December 8, 1982, stated:
No national legislation, no mini-treaty or no agreement entered into by the
"reciprocating nations" under any nation's municipal mining laws would provide a
good title as long as a global Convention exists under the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted in accordance with its rules and procedures.
Personal record of L.F.E. Goldie.
9. See Statement in Plenary Debate on USA Unilateral Seabed Mining Legislation,
Monday, July 28, 1980, at 1-2 (verbatim record taken from official LOS Conference tape).
For example, Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, Q.C., denounced the U.S. legislation, at the
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Act, 10 which President Carter signed into law on June 28, 1980.
Last December the United States was execrated for having firmly
acted on its belated discovery that the seabed mining regime,
which UNCLOS III has fabricated, seeks to establish an environment inimical to American resource interests, and for refusing to
go further down the path of agreeing to accept a designated
sacrificial role. Hence, this country is now censured for being, so
its accusers allege, guilty of bad faith. The critics of the United
States also charge this country with illegal conduct in breaking off
negotiations .for a treaty which had not been finally drafted.
The United States neither signed a treaty nor granted any irrevocable authority to another state or representative to sign a
treaty binding her to accept, here and now, the UN CLOS III
regime. What then, is the basis of this charge of bad faith and illegal conduct? It is derived from a number of spurious allegations,
namely: (1) that participation in the Conference has created
equities enuring in other states because of the belief that the
United States would become a party to the treaty, whether or not
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), Ninth Resumed Session, where he said, inter alia:
I wish to make quite clear what our position is, Mr. President. We regret this
legislation. We deplore it. We consider it unnecessary, undesirable, unjustifiable
and untimely. We consider it contrary to the concept of the common heritage of
mankind, a concept quite possibly the greatest of any principle or ideal which will
emerge from this Conference. We consider that it violates the fundamental principle, of which my Delegation had a large part in the establishment, to which the
Conference is dedicated, namely the principle of consensus. We do no accept the
validity of the arguments advanced in support of such legislation. We do not
understand the rationale for the legislation, coming as it does so close to the end of
this Conference, and we say this with the greatest of understanding for the country which has passed this legislation. We share the deep concern expressed by
speakers representing the vast majority of humanity, certainly the vast majority
of delegations represented at this Conference .... What we find particularly objectionable is that the Conference appears to be being told what to do on certain questions such as protection of investments. Surely there is a better approach and it's
one that USA delegation above all has always followed- the attempt to negotiate
in good faith to achieve equitable compromises.
Well, we are all here to negotiate in good faith and not on the basis of a dictate of a pre-judgment of the results specifically designed to override the outcome
of our deliberations if they don't happen to agree with the preconditions laid down.
For a selection of some additional samples of this kind of denunciation voiced at that
Plenary Debate, see Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed
Mining Debate: Part /, 15 INT'L LAW. 293, 298-300 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, A
Selection of Views: Part I].
10. Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473)(Supp. V
1981).
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her interests were adequately reflected in the final document; (2)
that the great majority of states which have signed the treaty
have pre-empted the exploitation of the minerals of the deep ocean
floor so as to preclude a state not a member of the regime created
under the Treaty from engaging in activities inconsistent with
that regime's policies and prescriptions; and (3) an argument that
has two aspects, one strong, the other weak, to the effect that the
United States' vote in favor of the Resolution, approved by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1970, entitled
the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Subsoil
Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 11 has a legally
preclusive effect that prevents the United States from permitting
deep seabed mining under its policies and laws. The key to both
arguments is in that Declaration's Article 1 which asserts:
The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common
heritage of mankind. 12

The strong argument simply asserts that the manifesto of Article l, "the common heritage of mankind," has become instant
customary international law. It operates effectively to preclude all
seabed mining activities outside the UNCLOS III regime "to be
established." It also is said to invalidate all other possible treaty
regimes on the subject. The weak argument, on the other hand,
merely asserts that the United States' vote in favor of the
Declaration of Principles carried the necessary implication,
despite declarations to the contrary, that this country also accepted the then emerging Group of 77's 13 interpretation of the
"common heritage" principle.
1.

"Instant Customary International Law''14

The strong argument for the preclusive effect of the
manifesto contained in the common heritage formula contends
11. Declaration of Principles, supra note 2.
12. Id. art. 1.
13. This is the name standardly given to the caucus of developing countries operating
on what they perceive to be their common interest in voting in the various institutions of
the United Nations family. The designation itself would now appear to be an anachronism,
since the number of caucus members has swollen from the original 77 to over .121 (at this
reviewer's last count). The number is still growing.
14. For the coinage of this evocative and descriptive phrase see Cheng, United Na-
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that international law has been changed by the General
Assembly's lopsided votes 15 in favor of the Moratorium and
Declaration of Principles Resolutions, and through its continuing
evolution towards the New International Economic Order 16 -the
stated objective of which is to facilitate the transference of wealth
and power to the developing world. 11 A result of this change, so
the contention runs, has been to invalidate the underlying property and contract institutions, doctrines, rules and concepts upon
which private and state-owned deep seabed mining enterprises
ground the legality, probable effectiveness and validity of their
predictions and transactions.
In this context, Article 29 of the United Nations Charter of
the Economic Rights and Duties of States is worth mentioning. It
summarizes the attitude of the Group of 77 towards both the hard
mineral resources of the deep ocean floor, and deep seabed mining
by the American mining industry and its partners, in the following
terms:
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the
area, are the common heritage of mankind. On the basis of the
principles adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 27 49
tions Resolution on Outer Space: "Instant International Customary Law"?, 5 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 23- (1965). For the relevance of voting support for the United Nations General
Assembly resolutions to the formation of international law, see Goldie, The North Sea Continental Shelf Case-A Ray of Hope for the International Court?, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 325,
342-49 (1970), and the authors cited therein as participants in the debate.
15. The vote on the Moratorium Resolution was 62 in favor, 28 against, 28 abstaining,
and 8 absent. None of the major maritime states, it should be noted, voted in favor of the
Moratorium Resolution. By contrast, the vote on the Declaration of Principles was 108 in
favor, none against, 14 abstaining, none absent.
16. See, e.g., United Nations Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States,
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, G.A.
Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 26 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3202, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974); Development and International Economic Cooperation, G.A. Res. 3362,
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1975); Preparation for an International
Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, G.A. Res. 33/193,
33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978). See also G.A. Res. 32/174, 32
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 107, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
17. See, e.g., R. MEAGHER, ANINTERNATIONALREDISTRIBUTIONOFWEALTHANDPOWER:
A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, passim (1979), and the
documents therein cited and presented.
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(XXV) of 17 December 1970, all States shall ensure that the exploration of the area and exploitation of its resources are carried
out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all States, taking into account the particular interests and needs of developing countries;
an international regime applying to the area and its resources
and including appropriate international machinery to give effect
to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty
of a universal character, generally agreed upon. 18

The two resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly
(namely the Moratorium and Declaration of Principles Resolutions)19 have been declared to create customary international law
here and now. Thus, the "Group of Legal Experts on the Question
of Unilateral Legislation" 20 have asserted, in their Manifesto, that:
The principles set out in resolution 27 49 (XXV) [Declaration
of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction]
are legally binding principles which were proclaimed in this
Declaration and upheld by the affirmative vote of 108 States. It
should be added that a number of the few States (14) which abstained on that occasion, although without formulating any objection, subsequently expressed, either explicitly or implicitly,
their support for those principles, as did other States members
of the international community, thus recognizing by their attitude the force of international custom as expressed in Resolution 2749.
This custom has given rise to the new general principles of

18. Charter of the Economic Rights, supra note 16, art. 29.
19. See supra note 5.
20. The Group of Legal Experts consisted of Dr. Roberto Herrera Caceres
(Honduras), Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands and the EEC, as Chairman, and the
following members: Professor Madjid Bencheickh (Algeria), Professor of Law; Professor
Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco), Dean of the Faculty of Law, Rabat; Dr. Jorge Castanneda
(Mexico), Ambassador, member of the International Law Commission; Dr. S.P. Jagota (India), Ambassador, Under-Secretary and Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
member of the International Law Commission; Dr. Julio Cesar Lupinacci (Uruguay), UnderSecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Biram Ndiaye (Senegal), Professor of Law,
University of Dakar; Dr. Frank X. Njenga (Kenya), Under-Secretary, member of the International Law Commission; Mr. C. Pinto (Sri Lanka), Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Germany, member of the International Law Commission; Mr. K. Rattray (Jamaica), Ambassador, Solicitor General, Attorney-General's Chambers; Dr. S. Sucharitkul (Thailand),
Director General, Treaty and Legal Departments, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of
the Internatinal Law Commission; Dr. Yasseen (United Arab Emirates), Counsellor, Permanent Mission at Geneva.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/7

6

Goldie: The Common Heritage Of Mankind.

1983]

The Common Heritage of Mankind

75

public international law which are the basis or legal foundation
of any substantive norms regulating the exploration of the area
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof and the
exploitation of their resources. 21

In support of the opposite thesis that the Declaration of Principles does not constitute international law, one should point out
that the Declaration must be read both in light of the explanations
of votes given to the First Committee of the General Assembly,
and Judge Sir Robert Jennings' assertion that "seen in the light of
these explanations the Declaration assumes a very different aspect from that reflected in the mere text of it." 22 Indeed, far from
having the legislative effect which, for example, the Group of
Legal Experts claim for it in their Manifesto, 23 the Declaration of
Principles has received neither a universal opinio iuris nor the
general support in state practice by the states most significantly
interested or directly affected. It must also be emphasized that
both of these two necessary conditions must be met before the
regime contemplated in the Declaration of Principles can lawfully
be said to have replaced the positive norms and established rights
and privileges now guaranteed by the freedom of the seas. On this
issue of the importance of practice, in addition to declarations
evidencing opinio iuris sive necessitatis, the International Court
of Justice spoke unequivocally in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, 2' when it stated that:
21. Letter dated April 23, 1979 from the Group of Legal Experts on the Question of
Unilateral Legislation to the Chairman of the Group of 77 (annexed to the letter dated April
24, 1979 from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the Chairman of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea). Geneva, Eighth Session, Mar. 19 to Apr. 27, 1979 at 6,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/77 (1979), 9 UNCLOS III O.R. 8th Sess., Geneva, Mar. 19 to Apr. 27,
1979 at 80, U.N. Sales No. E.80V.6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Manifesto]. See also AsIANAFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, STUDY ON THE REVISED SINGLE NEGOTIATING
TEXTS 10-11 (1976), where the following statement received agreement:
The only way which this concept [i.e., the status of the hard mineral resources of
the deep ocean floor beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state as "the common heritage of mankind"] can be translated into practice would be to treat the
resources of the area as being under the joint undivided ownership of all nations ....
If this is so, then the activities in the area have necessarily to be under [the] effective control of the international authority acting on behalf of the entire international community and activities by individual States or their nationals cannot be
permitted except when doing so on behalf of the authority.
22. Jennings, The United States Draft Treaty on the International Seabed Area:
Basic Principles, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 433, 435-36, 439 (1970).
23. See supra note 21.
24. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 19691.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
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Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way,
as to evidence a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 25

It should be noted, furthermore, that the Court rejected an
argument that a principle of equidistance (Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention), 26 had become crystallized into a
customary rule of international law through a combination of
definitional refinement in the successive drafts of the International Law Commission, and the adoption of the Continental
Shelf Convention by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. 27 The Court based this rejection on grounds of a
lack of uniformity of state practice in this regard in the past and
the probability of an equal lack of uniformity in the future because
of the permissibility of making reservations with respect to Article 6 (and the other articles apart from Articles 1-3). 28
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, however, now provide only a rather early milestone on the road to an increasing
acknowledgment of the role of the General Assembly, conferences
called by it, and its subsidiary organs, in the formation of international law. (Space does not permit an analysis of the classification of that law-i.e., as custom, general principles of international
law, etc.) 29 Apart from areas where the General Assembly is
recognized as having a special competence, for example, in the
regulation of its subsidiary organs, the Secretariat, or the territory of Namibia, 30 its resolutions may be consulted as indicating
trends in opinion and, further, as betokening legal developments.
For example, in the Western Sahara case, 31 the International
Court of Justice concluded that the right of self-determination for
non-self-governing territories had become a norm of international
law. In reaching this conclusion it first looked to Article l,
paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter which based the
25. Id. at 44. See also statements to a similar effect in The Asylum Case (Colum. v.
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Judgment of Nov. 20); The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 28 (Judgment of Sept. 7).
26. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, 474,
T.l.A.S. No. 5578, at 4, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 316 (effective June 10, 1964).
27. Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 38.
28. Id. at 38-39.
29. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38.
30. See The Namibia Case, supra note 1.
31. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of Jan. 3).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/7

8

Goldie: The Common Heritage Of Mankind.

1983]

The Common Heritage of Mankind

77

United Nations' purpose of developing friendly relations among
nations "on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples ...." 32 The Court then looked to the General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,33 and subsequent resolutions
and declarations on the topic. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, 34
the Court looked to conferences called by the General Assembly to
underpin, in part, the concept of the "preferential rights of the
coastal State in a special situation ...." 35
In the Western Sahara case, the Court could also support its
thesis by reference to supporting state practice. 36 Indeed, there
would appear to have been a veritable race of imperial divestiture
between those who spoke and voted in the General Assembly and
those who had ruled the colonial territories and were rapidly
transferring the powers of government to their former subjects.
The almost universal divestiture of colonial power was also an important, if barely mentioned, element underpinning the Court's
perspective in the Western Sahara case. 37 That decision reflected
the decisive state practice so essential for establishing the existence of a rule of customary international law. In addition, we
should not lose sight of the fact that the resolutions, like the
divestitures, were merely spelling out the modalities and carrying
into fruition the obligations which states had assumed under the
United Nations Charter.
The quality of consent, measured not only in terms of assenting votes, but also by practical performance and participation, remains an essential element. The stage has not been reached where
parliamentary diplomacy can be used as a tool in the hands of
large majorities of states in the General Assembly, and at con32. See also The Namibia Case, supra note 1, at 31.
33. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
34. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 19741.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25). For an early, discriminating and seminal view of the status, in international law, of resolutions of the
General Assembly, see the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in Southwest
Africa-Voting Procedure, 1955 l.C.J. 67, 115 (Advisory Opinion of June 7).
35. Id. at 26.
36. Note, for example, the Court's comment: "State practice on the subject of
fisheries reveals an increasing and widespread acceptance of the concept of preferential
rights for coastal States, particularly in favor of countries or territories in a situation of
special dependence on coastal fisheries." Id. In reviewing "state practice" the Court looked,
not only to resolutions and declarations at conferences, but also to agreements and arrangements in the North-East Atlantic and North-East Arctic. Id.
37. Western Sahara, 1975 l.C.J. at 29-35.
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ferences, to impose repugnant obligations on dissenting
minorities. This is especially true when such impositions effectively exclude the minorities' inputs into the prescriptive arena. 38 Nor
may those majorities use their numbers to render minority states'
interests meaningless.
In addition to these considerations, this writer has offered
elsewhere an argument more specifically relevant to the issue of
the status of the Declaration of Principles in terms of its failure to
have crystallized into customary international law. It is as follows:
Have these resolutions crystallized into law? And would such a
law make illegal any form of deep seabed mining beyond national
jurisdiction outside the regime to be devised at UNCLOS III?
At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 which drafted the
Charter of the United Nations,39 a proposal was made which
would have given the General Assembly power to declare international law. This was firmly rejected. But what would then be
the status of such resolutions as those containing the declarations of the "common heritage"? There are two levels of
effectiveness to be considered. First, resolutions of this kind, of
themselves, cannot be self-executing. They are not legislation
with immediately obligating effects. Some resolutions, however,
such as that on decolonization, through both the widespread support they received and the speedy implementation of their goals
in the practice of states, especially in practice of the former colonizing states, have become recognized as customary international law. On the other hand, when implementation by universal or near universal state practice is lacking, the relevant
resolutions have merely the quality of the "policy directives" of
say, the Irish and Indian Constitutions.
But such "policy directives" are not entirely ineffective.
They do at least impose duties of respect and recognition by virtue of their moral force. A state acting against their terms
should thoroughly consider its compelling reasons for so acting,
especially if, while some states choose to ignore that directive,
others are building up a state practice in its support. So far,
there has been little, if any, state practice implementing the
"common heritage" principle.

38. For a discussion of the important notion of the prescriptive arena in the formation
of international obligations, see McDougal, Laswell, and Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Division, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73
(C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1969).
39. The Charter entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945.
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There is a further consideration. Where states act, even if in
order to implement a General Assembly Resolution, in a manner
which invades the existing rights of other states and involves
breaches of international law, further grave issues are raised.
Today, for example, the seizure of a foreign flag ship, without
lawful justification (that is, without the justification of a treaty,
customary international law, right or privilege so to act), is a
breach of the customary international law of the sea. It also involves a breach of the United Nations Charter (including Article
2, paragraph 4).' 0 While, traditionally, customary international
law could once have been created through acts which were
originally unlawful if acquiesced in for a sufficiently long period,
and on a sufficiently wide basis, it is doubtful whether the world
community would today accept a legal principle based on acts in
defiance of the United Nations Charter. It is to be doubted,
furthermore, if the essential ingredient of acquiescence would be
forthcoming. It should be noted, therefore, that a state practice
seeking to implement the "common heritage" principle should
not itself be steeped in initial illegality. This may well leave the
establishment of that principle to the consent of the states concerned in a univer-sal or nearly universal convention rather than
through the high-handed unilateral and illegal acts of states
seeking, through confrontation tactics, to establish what they
claim (and mistakenly claim, it is insisted) to be a state practice
leading to the creation of a proposed rule of customary international law.
It seems to me, therefore, that here and now we are in a
situation of stasis. On the one hand, there is an imminent
possibility of change; on the other, there is no body of law prohibiting deep seabed mining. Furthermore, many of the acts
which might be taken to prevent such mining could themselves
constitute serious breaches of international law-for example,
infringement of the rights of the flag nation of a mining ship,
breaches of the "rules of the road," and illegal searches and
seizures.' 1
40. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
para. 4.
It seems unusual to this writer that the "Group of Legal Experts" would advocate the
argument suggested in the text accompanying note 27 supra, an argument premised upon
and supporting, or at least sympathizing with, conduct constituting such a palpable breach
of the U.N. Charter.
41. Goldie, Customary International Law and Deep Seabed Mining, 6 SYR. J. INT'L L.
& COM. 173, 180-82 (1979).
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Interpretation: a Matter of "Good Faith" and Alleged
''Reliance" through ''Participation"

The proponents of the argument for the legislative effect of a
General Assembly Resolution assert that the United States, by accepting the principle of the common heritage of mankind, participating in the negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and especially, in the drafting of
Articles 136 and 137 of the Treaty, 42 has also accepted the Group
of 77's interpretation of the phrase common heritage, rather than
the interpretation expounded by American spokesmen and
representatives at the Conference. The accusers argue that the
imputed acceptance entitles them to charge any subsequent
United States action in support or regulation of its domestic deep
seabed mining industry as a breach of that international legislation. Their thesis is based on the premise that the only possible
interpretation of the common heritage of mankind is that it
operates preclusively on mining activities not licensed under the
regime as instant customary international law, immediately binding on all the states of the world. Such an interpretation repeals
the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, at least insofar as it
applies to the deep seabed and its resources, and dedicates the exclusive control of that seabed area to a centralized enclosure. 43

3.

Other Perspectives

On the other hand, many other interpretations are possible,
not all of which have the preclusive effect of the one put forward
by the representatives of the Group of 77. Indeed, one other interpretation considers an inclusive open access customary regime to
be as legitimate as the preclusive interpretation under the common heritage slogan. The open access interpretation, which has
been reiterated by the United States representatives at every opportunity, asserts that, insofar as it reflects customary international law, common heritage means no more than the commonness of a common field wherein all may pasture their stock, or a
42. Article 136 states: "The Area [the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction] and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind." U.N. Doc. A!CONF. 62/122 (1980). For the text of Article 137, see infra note 47.
43. For a discussion of enclosures in the context of the world's commons see supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text. See also Goldie, A Modest Proposal for Preventing International Law from being a Burthen to the International Community and to Law
Teachers, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 336-37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, Modest Proposal].
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common well wherefrom all may draw their water, or a common
stream in which all may fish. Its commonness means that no state
may assert exclusive, territorial sovereignty over any part of it. 44
This interpretation may be contrasted with the first position, that
of the Group of 77. Spokesmen of that group argue that when the
U .N. General Assembly agreed to the common heritage principle
of Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles, a preclusive regime
was thereby immediately established regarding deep seabed mining, and that, notwithstanding the prior legal position, the
freedom of the high seas no longer applied to mining activities
under the high seas and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
A third definition, that advocated by Ambassador Arvid
Pardo, argues that the Declaration of Principles has prescribed an
ideal of the centralized or international enclosure 45 of the high
seas. This should apply to all of the resources of the oceans beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, not only to deep seabed mining.
Pardo deplores the national enclosures of the oceans' commons by
coastal states which the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea permits.'6
C.

THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS

1.

The Group of 77's Assertion of a Preclusive Effect

The Group of 77's position was succinctly stated by Ambassador Pinto to the ~aw of the Sea Workshop on December
11-14, 1978 at the University of Hawaii. He argued that the
mineral resources of the deep seabed are currently res publicae.
This he defined as follows:
This [the common heritage of mankind] means that those
minerals cannot be freely mined. They are not there, so to speak,
for the taking. The common heritage of mankind is the common
property of mankind. The commonness of the "common heritage"
is a commonness of ownership and benefit. The minerals are
owned in common by your country and mine, and by all the rest
as well. In their original locations these resources belong in undivided and indivisible share to your country and to mine, and to

44. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.

45. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; see also Goldie, Modest Proposal,
supra note 43, at 336-37.
46. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 21 l.L.M. 1261.
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all the rest-to all mankind, in fact, whether organized as States
or not. If you touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea, you
touch my property. If you take them away, you take away my
property.'7

He further explained this definition in terms of the interpretation, advocated by the Group of 77, of the common heritage
principle, as effectively denying any right of access on the part of
any person or state prior to the establishment of a world-wide
treaty regime. He contended that:
It follows, therefore, that before you can mine the nodules and
win them from the bottom of the sea, mankind must have consented to the method you have chosen. It is because all of us
agreed eight years ago that this was the absolute, fundamental
rule of the game, that this was in fact, the law, that we have
engaged in for eight years in trying to decide what method or
system of resource-taking shall have mankind's approval.'8

An additional argument has been propounded that Paragraph
1 of the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles has effectively dedicated the hard minerals of the deep seabeds to the
world community's sole use as a whole and as having effectively
denied private (or state enterprise) access, except by permission
of the representatives of "all the peoples of the world." 49 In addi47. Pinto, Statement, in ALTERNATIVES IN DEEPSEA MINING 13 (S. Allen & J. Craven
eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Pinto, Statement]. Article 137 of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention]
formulates, as a Treaty-based agreement, not as a customary norm, the specifics of this
view in the following terms:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridicial person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign
rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.
3. No state or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with
this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be
recognized.
48. Pinto, Statement, supra note 47, at 13-14.
49. See Draft Convention, supra note 47, Art. 137. See also Statement of Mr. Pohl (El
Salvador), 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781st mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1975, at 2 (1970); see
statement of Mr. Zegers (Chile), U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1975, at 2 (1970), where Mr. Zegers
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tion to representatives of the Group of 77 and of the Eastern European Bloc countries in the General Assembly, other leaders of
opinion in the Second and Third Worlds have echoed this view; for
example, the "Group of Legal Experts on the Question of
Unilateral Legislation" 50 have contended that:
The principles of law laid down in resolution 2749 (XXV) form
the basis of any international regime applicable to the Area and
its resources ....
Consequently, any unilateral act or mini-treaty is unlawful
in that it violates these principles, for the legal regime, whether
provisional or definitive, can only be established with the consent of the international community as the sole representative of
mankind and in conformity with the system determined by the
international community.
It should be stressed that no investor would have any legal
guarantee for his investments in such activities, for he would
likewise be subject to individual or collective action by the other
States in defense of the common heritage of mankind, and no
purported diplomatic protection would carry any legal weight
whatsoever. 51

This interpretation that the common heritage of mankind has
a preclusive effect on deep seabed mining, and the Group of 77's
attack on the U.S. thesis regarding the right of her citizens to
mine for manganese nodules, has been examined by Ambassador
Pinto in terms of Roman Law doctrines and analogies. He declared
that:
The legal status of the resources of deep seabed itself forbids
mining under unilaterally developed individual or group regimes
however well-intentioned, however efficient, however designed
to fit in and coalesce with some future internationally agreed
said, inter alia: "Legally, we might contend that it is an indivisible property with fruits that
can be divided. But politically and economically speaking, it means that all states, coastal or
landlocked, will participate in the administration of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction
and in the benefits derived from that region." See also statements of the representatives of
Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Malaysia, Libya, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, and Brazil et al., U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1788, at 2, 10, 13 (1970); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1786, at 2 (1970); U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1780, at 2-3 (1970); U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1784, at 7 (1970); and U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1777, at 11 (1970).
50. See supra note 20.
51. See supra note 21.
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regime .... [T]he "common heritage" of these resources ... is
more akin to property held in trust - held in trust for "mankind
as a whole," for the public. It is therefore closest to "res
publicae," the property of the people, to be administered by the
people and for the people. 52

Much juridical analysis has gone into Ambassador Pinto's
persuasive presentation, and into that of his colleagues, regarding
their interpretation of the common heritage principle. By contrast,
no commensurate explanation has convincingly vindicated their
premises by justifying the legal validity of that interpretation, or
of the claims deriving therefrom. The question of how that one
view of the principle of the common heritage has come to supplant
the freedom of the high seas and has transformed what was once
the lawful exercise of an assured privilege into an unlawful act, remains unanswered.
2.

Freedom of the High Seas and Open Access to Common Goods

Theodore Kronmiller 53 has supported the view advocated by
the United States and other developed Western democracies as an
application of the traditional doctrine of the freedom of the high
seas. This is expressed in terms of a theory of common access to
common goods. He has summarized this position in the following
conclusory statement:
[U]nder international law, it is permissible for a State or private
enterprise unilaterally to appropriate the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Deep
seabed mining is clearly within the principle of the freedom of
the seas and is consistent with rules of customary international
law and relevant conventional law. All States are under a duty to
respect the lawful exercise of the freedom to explore and exploit
the resources of the deep seabed and subsoil.
To this it should be added that, in international law, there is
no reason why this activity may not be supported by domestic
legislation which does not purport to claim sovereignty or
sovereign rights over, or ownership of, areas of the deep seabed
and subsoil or otherwise to exclude nationals of nonconsenting
States.54
52. Pinto, Statement, supra note 47, at 14-15.
53. T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING (1980).

54. Id. at 521.
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After a thorough review of both the Declaration of Principles
and the Moratorium Resolution, with reference to the emergence
of the thesis that seabed hard minerals beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any state are the common heritage of mankind, he
argues that, while acceptance of the doctrine is widespread, if not
universal, it remains without specific content or applicability. Indeed, he argues that all states should have access to the exploration and exploitation of the minerals of the ocean floor, 55 and that
this concept will remain valid under customary law until it is
replaced by a universally accepted treaty. Exceptions to the current customary regime may come into being, however, through
more particular treaties among the parties, the transnational
operations of appropriately drafted domestic legislation creating
reciprocal regimes, and proposals to the participating states by
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The supporters of open access and freedom of the high seas
argue that, short of universal acceptance, the regime prescribed in
the U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Sea necessarily remains a
special treaty regime operating only among the parties to it. 56 This
last point too frequently appears to have been forgotten, perhaps
largely due to the enthusiastic rhetoric of those who wish to
establish a new universal regime which would oust the present
customary law system. Their especial target for demolition appears to be the freedom of the high seas, and the rights, liberties
and privileges, including free and equal access to the oceans'
resources, which flow therefrom.
The premise of the argument that the Declaration of Principles does not constitute an instant and preclusive rule of international law 57 is the surely unobjectionable proposition that, on the
basis of the sovereign equality and independence of states, a state
should not be held to be bound by an international instrument to
which it is not a consenting party. If such an instrument reflects
55. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, 54TH CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE
824 (1970). Indeed, Kronmiller points out that this is an example of actions taken "not only
within the U .N ., but also outside it, to affirm and to give content to the notion of the common heritage of mankind." He argues that this exemplifies, and testifies, to the historical
fact that the "common heritage existed independently of the General Principles
Resolution." KRONMILLER, supra note 53, at 238-39.
56. On this issue, which has become only too facilely blurred in debate, see the important discussion by Jennings, supra note 22 at 435-36.
57. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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agreement between a number of states, it still necessarily remains
res inter alios acta amongst all others. A vitally interested nonsignatory state may not be deprived of its existing fundamental
rights and freedoms without its consent and without due attention
being paid to its right to determine its own destiny.
In the meantime, exceptions to the current customary order
may attain legal status between the parties by more particular
treaty regimes, or by the transnational operation of appropriately
drafted reciprocating domestic legal systems, or by adherence to
the regime to be established under the Treaty which was signed
at Montego Bay in December 1982. That treaty culminated the
long, arduous work of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, but it still awaits a sufficient number of
adherences before it can enter into force among a minimum
number of parties to it.
One final point: The United States' position, reflected in the
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act of 1980,58 advocates
open access and an escrow fund for all. This could arguably be said
to be tinged with Professor John Rawls' "second principle of
justice" because while it envisages an inequality of access to exploitable resources, it seeks to give the greatest tangible benefits
to the most disadvantaged. 59

3.

Ambassador Arvid Pardo- "Centralized Enclosure"

A third interpretation of the common heritage principle is
that of Ambassador Arvid Pardo, who is regarded as the progenitor60 of this phrase in the law of the sea context. In his critical
review of the law of the sea negotiations, he wrote:
The objective of the Maltese proposal was to replace the
principle of freedom of the seas by the principle of common
heritage of mankind in order to preserve the greater part of
ocean space as a commons accessible to the international community. The commons of the high seas, however, would be no
longer open to the whims of the users and exploiters; it would be
internationally administered. International administration of the
commons and management of its resources for the common good
58. See supra note 10.
59. For a critical discussion of the application of Professor John Rawls' principles and
prescriptions of justice to the international arena, see S. HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS
154-58 (1981).
60. See, Pardo, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, 62 PROC. AM. Soc·y INT'L L. 216 (1968).
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distinguished the principle of common heritage from the traditional principle of the high seas as res communis. 61

He added the explanation that:
[I]n the Maltese view the common heritage concept has five
basic implications. First, the common heritage of mankind could
not be appropriated; it was open to use by the international community but was not owned by the international community. Second, it required a system of management in which all users have
a right to share. Third, it implied an active sharing of benefits,
not only financial but also benefits derived from shared management and transfer of technology, thus radically transforming the
conventional relationships between states and traditional concepts of development aid. Fourth, the concept of common
heritage implied reservation for peaceful purposes, insofar as
politically achievable, and, fifth, it implied reservation for further generations, and thus had environmental implications.
For Malta the principle of common heritage was conceptually joined with the idea of functional sovereignty, as distinguished from the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty.62

While Pardo sees the common heritage as a guiding principle for
the negotiation of a new regime to replace the current customary
rule of the freedom of the high seas, Ambassador Pinto argues
that it has already been established as a general international law
norm created by the fiat of the United Nations General Assembly 63
to govern deep seabed mining operations.
Ambassador Pardo interprets the common heritage as a proposal to be negotiated with the object of setting up a treaty
regime supplanting the customary rule of the freedom of the high
seas, limited to deep seabed mining but including all uses which
rely on the traditional customary international law doctrine. He
advocates a completely new blueprint for the law governing mankind's use of the resources of the high seas beyond the limits of
the resource jurisdiction of any state. He espouses the complete
61. Pardo, Law of the Sea Conference- What Went Wrong, in MANAGING OCEAN
RESOURCES: A PRIMER 137, 139 (Friedheim ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Friedheim].
62. Id. at 141.
63. For a critical comment on the use of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UN CLOS III) as a vechicle for world socialism, especially in relation to deep
seabed mining, see Goldie, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed Mining Debate: Part II, 15 INT'LLAW. 445, 451-69, & 469-97 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, A
Selection of Views: Part II]. Part I of the selection was published in 15 INT'L LAW. 293
(1981), see supra note 9.
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replacement of the regime of the freedom of the high seas by a
regime of equitable management. He is also concerned that the
concentration of his ideal of the common heritage upon deep seabed mining alone signals the probable loss of an historic opportunity for mankind.
D.

AN ANIMADVERSION ON "ENCLOSURES"

Emphasis can be given to the distinction between common access to a common resource and exclusive management, in the
name of the public benefit, by reiterating this writer's comments
of a decade and more ago:
On all hands people uncritically accept as true the lightsome
remark that freedom of the high seas serves the interests of the
Great States and therefore the restriction of that freedom must
inevitably provide a vital lifeline for the lesser and poorer nations. True it is all that states, great and small, individually seek
to increase, to the maximum degree, their own exclusive uses of
the common seas' resources. In such enterprises the richer and
more assertive might well be seen as benefiting more from their
common heritage than the poorer or more modest. In such a freefor-all many states cause their jurisdictions to creep, and leap,
sea ward in an enclosure movement. But I have yet to find the
enclosure of a manor's commons which profited its yeomanry.
For I am told by a wor[l]dly-wise [sic] London friend that all
private Acts of Enclosure are introduced into the Parliament by
Members who are drawn from the village squirearchy. These
landed gentlemen carry through their bills either on their own
behalf or to assist friends placed in a similar standing in the
agricultural interests of their counties. Is the situation among
nations so different? Like great magnates, great states could
live well upon abundant resources which a seaward enclosure
movement would add to their present wealth. Small states, by
contrast would, with only rare and perhaps bizarre exceptions,
be entitled to more meagre patches of the commons. Lastly,
landlocked states would suffer the fates of cottagers who
previously owned no land of their own but could wring
sustenance from the village common, but who, after an
enclosure, become landless save for their little garden plots, and
so must find masters in order to stay alive and feed their
families.
Should the seas become enclosed, may not ships be forced to
pay tolls and transit fees along routes which formerly were free?
And may not fishermen become merely rent-paying tenants and
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licensees as if states held the divided fields of the formerly common oceans in fee? The costs, which these tolls and rents would
add to all commodities drawn from or moved across the sea,
would inevitably fall, like infamous excise taxes, most heavily
upon the poorest and those least likely to reap an equivalent
benefit from being able to impose similar charges in their turn.
The smaller states would thus be excluded from the major
benefits of an enclosure of the oceans, but they would still bear a
disproportionate share of the higher costs and prices which
would result from the engrossment of the oceanic commons into
the exclusive patrimonies of coastal states. 64

IL

THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERPRETAT/ON-SELECTION

The negotiating significance of asserting the customary law
status of the Group of 77's definition of the mineral resources of
the deep ocean bed as the common heritage of mankind and, in
Ambassador Pinto's terms, as res publicae, is that countries with
a seabed mining technology are thereby precluded from bargaining for diplomatic concessions as a quid pro quo for their acceptance of Article 137 of the Treaty 65 and all the other provisions
predicated upon it. Indeed, it is the possibility of thus reversing
the bargaining postures of the negotiating parties, so that the industrialized democracies can be represented as seeking, rather
than granting, concessions which explains the vehemence of the
Group of 77's spokesmen in advancing their quite baroque argument.
It was a bold bid. If, under customary international law, those
countries' enterprises are already precluded from mining, then
they can be called upon to make concessions to gain that privilege
under the Treaty. If, on the other hand, customary international
law remains unchanged, then Article 137 of the Treaty reflects a
desideratum of the countries which lack deepsea mining
technology but which are determined to participate in its conduct
no less than in its advantages. Article 137's definition of the common heritage, under such circumstances, would have to be paid for
by reciprocal concessions to the technologically advanced countries in the all-important areas of technology transfer, access,

64. Goldie, Modest Proposal, supra note 43, at 336-37.
65. See supra note 47.
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representation and taxation. Here again, hesitancy and reluctant
consent have prevented the United States and the other Western
democracies from pressing their just and lawful claims for the due
recognition and respect for their currently existing rights under
the customary international law doctrine of the freedom of the
high seas. 66
To the extent that the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
would abridge the existing customary international law rights of
acquisition over seabed resources, it is important to be clearheaded about the consequences of accepting that abridgment with
neither adequate safeguards nor an appropriate quid pro quo. This
would be tantamount to the expropriation of valuable United
States interests, expectations and claims. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the United States to realize clearly the expropriatory
aspects of the Treaty's present provisions. These are presently
contrary to the mandate contained in the Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act of 1980.67 In passing the Act, Congress intended that any international agreement to which the United
States might become a party should provide, in part: (1) assured
and non-discriminatory access to the deep seabed hard mineral
resources; (2) security of tenure to U.S. citizens whose rights have
accrued prior to the Treaty's entry into force with respect to the
United States; (3) continued exploration and recovery activities on
the part of U.S. citizens to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the Treaty; and (4) protection of interim investment. 68
In addition to these four stipulations, which constitute a Congressional instruction to the Department of State and to the U.S.
Delegation, the Act puts all states participating in the Conference
on notice of the conditions precedent for the United States'
satisfaction with the Treaty. Yet, these clearly expressed directives would appear to have been more honored in the breach than
the observance, as far as the existing seabed mining provisions of
the Law of the Sea Treaty are concerned. In contrast with Congress' policy directives regarding the content of the Convention,
66. See Friedheim, A rvid Pardo, the Law of the Sea Conference, and the Future of
the Oceans, in MANAGING OCEAN RESOURCES: A PRIMER 137, 149 (Friedheim ed. 1979). For a
discussion of this contribution to the Law of the Sea Debate, see Goldie, A Selection of
Views: Part //, supra note 63, at 494-96.
67. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
68. 30 u.s.c. § 1401(b).
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the present Treaty testifies to the Conference's objective,
especially in the seabed mining context, of shackling the United
States' technology to the chariot wheels of the triumphant New
International Economic Order.

!IL
A.

THE UNITED STATES' EXPLANATIONS OF ITS VOTE
FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
A GENERAL OBSERVATION

Judge Sir Robert Jennings asserted that one state cannot be
bound by another's interpretation of an instrument such as the
Declaration of Principles, and that each state's own explanation of
the vote it gave in the First Committee of the General Assembly,
as well as of its contemporary or relevant statements as to its
understanding, should provide the measure of its assumption of
obligations, if any, stemming from the Declaration. 69 Therefore,
such explanations, statements and avowals by key officials of the
United States should be reviewed. In the meantime, the following
extracts will show that, while acceptance of the common heritage
formula is widespread, if not universal, it remains without the
specific agreed-upon content or applicability which Ambassador
Pinto and his colleagues seek to give it. Indeed, one can equally
justify the proposition that what the doctrine may indicate is a
right of access by all states to the exploration and exploitation of
the minerals of the ocean.
Before reviewing the specific and diverse statements made by
the representatives of the states voting in the General Assembly,
reference should be made to Ambassador Amersinghe's comment
on the lack of consensus in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction. He wrote, in a letter to the Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly:
As a result of these consultations, a draft Declaration has emerged

which, in my opinion, reflects the highest degree of agreement attainable at the present time. It does not, however, represent a consensus
of all the members of the Committee.698
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69a. See Letter dated 24 November 1970 from the Chairman of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.542 (November
25, 1970) (issued in mimeographed form only), reproduced in the Appendix.
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These words are especially significant because of their author's
special eminence, qualifications, and objectivity.
Furthermore, the diversity of the explanations which the
delegates gave for their votes in the General Assembly testifies to
the fact that no one interpretation was generally accepted at the
time of the vote. This is underscored by the fact that the term
"common heritage" was left undefined in the Declaration. The
meaning which Ambassador Pinto 70 and the Group of Legal Experts71 now seek to consecrate cannot be regarded as founded in
any kind of general consensus such as they seek to attribute to the
vote taken on the General Principles Resolution. Indeed, far from
having the legislative effect which the Group of Legal Experts
claim in their Manifesto, 72 the meaning of common heritage has to
date received neither a universal opinio juris, nor general support
in state practice. Both of these two necessary conditions must be
shown to exist before the regime contemplated in the Declaration
of Principles can validly be said to have replaced the existing
positive norms, established rights, immunities, and privileges
which are guaranteed by the freedom of the seas. While two contradictory theories of common heritage (contrast the analogy of
the common well from which all may freely draw their water with
the res publicae definition) are equally inchoate, neither can be
claimed to define the law here and now. On the other hand, if some
generally accepted customary rule supports one, but not the
other, then that one should be preferred. Clearly, the freedom of
the high seas, which still prevails, justifies the common well
analogy and excludes the res publicae definition. On this basis,
then, the common well definition, not the Pinto definition, should
have been insisted upon as the preferred starting point of negotiations.
B.

THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF ITS AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FOR THE 1970 DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND OF RELATED RESOLUTIONS

1.

The Diplomatic Rather than Legislative Quality of the
Declaration of Principles
When the Declaration of Principles Resolution was being
70. See supra notes 13, 47 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 20.
72. See supra note 21 and the accompanying text. See also supra note 49.
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reviewed in the First Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly prior to its presentation to the Plenary of the General
Assembly, the United States, which had taken a leading part in
the negotiation of the compromise formula which the Seabeds
Committee had finally agreed upon, stated to the world its
understanding that the Declaration was of a diplomatic and compromissory nature:
One of the most difficult aspects of reaching agreement on a
declaration of principles was the need, recognized by all who participated in the work, to avoid prejudicing the positions of States
regarding resolution 257 4D (XXIV). A careful study of the
declaration as a whole, particularly the third paragraph of the
preamble and operative paragraphs 3 through 6, shows that due
to the goodwill and skill of all our colleagues this has been accomplished satisfactorily. 78

2.

Preservation of the Freedom of the High Seas

President Nixon, in his Oceans Policy Statement of May 23,
1970, stressed the continuing right of the states engaging in the
negotiations for a seabed mining regime to continue exercising the
freedom of the high seas. He pointed out:
I do not, however, believe that it is either necessary or desirable
to try to halt exploration and exploitation of the sea-beds beyond
a depth of 200 meters during the negotiating period.
Accordingly, I call on all other nations to join the United
States in an interim policy .... The regime should accordingly
include due protection for the integrity of investments made in
the interim period. 74

Even in the early days of the negotiations there was little consensus regarding the meaning of the common heritage. Thus, in
1971 the staff of the United States Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, in The Law of the Sea Crisis observed:
Late last year the General Assembly adopted a "Declaration
of Legal Principles" (Resolution 27 49 (XXV) of December 17,
1970). It included these words:
73. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1799th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799 (1970).
74. Statement by President Nixon on the Oceans Policy of the United States, May 23,
1970. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/22. See also Oceanography Miscellaneous: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. On Merchant
Marine and Fisheries on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
25-26 (1972).
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The seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter
referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the
area, are the common heritage of mankind.
This idea of common heritage was said to be the base of a future
Law-of-the-Sea Convention and to lay the foundation for the control of the international seabeds area. While the delegates at
Geneva this summer frequently included in their presentations a
reference to "common heritage," there was no agreement on the
meaning of the concept. 76

Without a universally accepted treaty definition or the development, by widespread state practice, of a customary norm replacing the freedom of the high seas, the freedom of access inherent in
freedom of the high seas remains the norm.

3.

The Moratorium Resolution's Failure to be Accepted as
Legally Obligatory

References to the Moratorium Resolution's failure to achieve
a general consensus, although it did receive sufficient affirmative
votes to qualify as having been approved by the General
Assembly, is significant. Had it reflected consensus, it would have
justified arguments leading to the conclusion that, by agreement,
the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas no longer applied to
the minerals of the deep ocean floor beyond the jurisdiction of any
state.
(a) The Special Subcommittee on the Outer Continental
Shelf stated, in its Report on the Outer Continental Shelf to the
United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
that:
The United States also opposed the Moratorium Resolution,
which declared a moratorium on all exploitation of the seabed
resources pending the establishment of an international deepsea
regime.
With regard to an interim policy, the President suggested
that all permits for exploration and exploitation be issued subject to the international regime to be agreed upon, with a portion

75. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., REPORT ON THE LA w OF THE SEA CRISIS
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of the revenues from interim exploitation to be paid to an appropriate international development agency .76

(b) Charles N. Brower, Esq., Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on
the Law of the Sea wrote the following in a letter to Mrs. Leonor
K. Sullivan, Chairperson, United States House of Representatives
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, and informed her of
the failure, in the U.N. General Assembly, of further initiatives
regarding the reiteration of the Moratorium Resolution:
One other significant development at this General
Assembly, fortunately in keeping with the spirit that dominated
the negotiation of the Conference Resolution, was the fact that
no new resolution calling for a moratorium on deep seabed activities was introduced .... [We] believe that the avoidance of a
renewed and divisive debate on this subject was related to the
general attempts to ensure the best possible atmosphere as we
enter the final stage of preparatory work this year. Needless to
say, our own opposition to the moratorium remains unchanged. 77

(c) John R. Stevenson, Esq., Chairman, Inter-Agency Law of
the Sea Task Force and Legal Adviser, Department of State,
stated in a letter to the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Chairman,
United States Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
dated May 19, 1972:
As you know, at the 24th General Assembly in 1969, a
resolution commonly known as the "Moratorium Resolution" was
passed despite significant "no" votes and abstentions. The
Resolution purports to prohibit exploitation of the resources of
the area of seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
76. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF. 91st Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT
ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF TO THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS 4, 24
(Comm. Print 1970).
77. Hearings on H.R. 9 & H.R. 7732 ("Deep Seabed Hard Minerals'~ Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (letter from Charles N. Brower, Esq., Acting Legal Adviser,
Department of State and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea,
to Mrs. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, U.S. House of Representatives Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Comm., May 16, 1973). See also id. at 25 (statement of Hon. Charles N.
Brower) and Hearings ("Status Report on the Law of the Sea Conference·~ Before the Sub-

comm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, at 23 (1973) (letter by Hon. Charles N. Brower to Hon. Henry
M. Jackson, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, March 1, 1973).
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beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, pending the establishment of an internationally agreed regime for the area. The
United States is not legally bound by this Resolution, although it
is required to give good faith consideration to the Resolution in
determining its policies.
In his May 23, 1970 Oceans Policy Statement, President Nixon indicated that it is neither necessary nor desirable to try to
halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a depth
of 200 meters during the negotiating process. He also called on
other nations to join the U.S. in an interim policy and suggested
that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabeds
beyond 200 meters be issued subject to the international regime
to be agreed upon. He stated that the regime should include due
protection for the integrity of investments made in the interim
period. 78

(d) Again, in a statement entitled "Oceanography
Miscellaneous: Geneva U.N. Seabed Committee" dated September
26, 1972, before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Mr. Stevenson observed that:
One issue that we had feared would be very disruptive and
prevent constructive work last summer fortunately did not
prove to be as difficult as might have been anticipated. The
delegation of Kuwait had, at the end of the spring session, introduced a moratorium resolution prohibiting activities with a
view to exploitation of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction until the establishment of an international regime. Consideration was postponed until the summer session. However, at
the summer session, this issue was not extensively discussed until very late in the session. The Kuwait delegation did not press
for adoption or a vote on the issue, and was content to have its
proposal included in the report of the committee. It will of course
be before us in the General Assembly, and I think it is prudent to
anticipate that action may be taken on this proposal at the
General Assembly.
Of course, the General Assembly took similar action in 1969,
and UNCTAD took similar action just this spring. We continue

78. Hearings on S.2801 ("Development of Hard Mineral Resources of Deep Seabed'~
Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1972) (letter from John R. Stevenson, Chairman, Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force, and Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Senator Henry M. Jackson, May 19, 1972).
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to take the position that such a resolution is legally ineffective
and disruptive of our progress in achieving an international
regime, which is the only permanent solution to be envisaged in
this area.
With respect to this issue, we again had to answer the argument of a number of countries that the declaration of principles
regarding the seabed adopted in 1970 without any dissenting
vote by the General Assembly, somehow implied, in light of the
common heritage principle, that there could not be any exploitation until an international regime had been adopted. We of
course continued to state - and we were supported in this by a
number of other countries - that common heritage does not
mean common property. 79

Later in the same Hearings, Mr. Ratiner added this further
gloss to Mr. Stevenson's remarks regarding the relevant General
Assembly resolutions on a moratorium and on legal principles (including the common heritage clause):
The original United Nations General Assembly principles
were the product of a great deal of compromise, and accordingly
there is considerable ambiguity in those principles, an ambiguity
which cannot easily be carried over into a treaty which will
govern large commercial investment. It is simply too ambiguous,
so that the negotiation now taking place is an attempt to define
what those principles really mean in treaty language, and the
principles themselves can only be seen as guidelines. I think
most delegations in the Seabeds Committee working group
understand that that is the case. And, indeed, I think the work
product of Subcommittee I's working group reflects the fact that
many principles were changed in the course of the negotiations
and new texts were produced which, in important respects, do
not directly reflect what some delegations thought the principles
meant when they were adopted by the General Assembly. 80
C.

SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS REFLECTING THE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMON HERITAGE

In addition to finding states' understandings of the meaning
of the term common heritage in their explanations of the votes
79. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography on "Oceanography
Miscellaneous" of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 237,
242 (1972) (statement by John R. Stevenson, Esq., et al., to the Subcomm. on Oceanography
of the House of Representatives Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries).
80. Id. at 250.
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they gave in the General Assembly, 81 evidence of their perceptions
is also available in their subsequent statements. Such statements
shed light on the established and continuing meanings which were
given at the time of the vote or signature. These subsequent facts,
statements, and conduct are relevant only in a subordinate capacity, however. They do not establish an authoritative meaning, but
they may be significant to corroborate and explain the intentions,
understandings, points of view and premises of policy affirmed at
the date of the vote. An analogy is found in the international law
theory of the critical date. 82 Thus, in the Island of Palmas Case, 88
Judge Huber stated:
The events falling between the Treaty of Paris, December 10,
1898, and the rise of the present dispute in 1906, cannot in
themselves serve to indicate the legal situation of the island at
the critical moment when the cession of the Philippines by Spain
took place. They are however indirectly of a certain interest,
owing to the light they might throw on the period immediately
preceding. 84

Again, in his separate opinion in the Minquiers and Ecrehos
Case, Judge Basdevant considered the critical date of that case to
be October 24, 1360, the date of the Treaty of Bretigny or Calais. 85
He considered that as a result of the Treaty's separation of
English from Continental or French Normandy, dealings by each
country in connection with the Minquiers and Ecrehos islets and
reefs should be regarded as detailed applications of the division
made in 1360 and thus further explaining it. It was on this basis
that facts after 1360 right up to the date of the Compromis
(December 29, 1950) were admitted. 86 These later events should
not be regarded as having independent probative value; their
function is merely to resolve issues of detail and to elaborate further upon the meaning of the Treaty. Similarly, subsequent explanatory pronouncements further the original and continuing
81. See, Jennings, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82. For a conspectus of this doctrine, see Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 1251 (1963). For a discussion of the problem of subsequent facts, see id. at 1254-55.
83. The Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
84. Id. at 125.
85. The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 l.C.J. 4, 76-84 (Order of January 29, 1953)
(separate opinion of Judge Basdevant).
86. Id. at 83-84.
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understanding of the United States regarding its vote in favor of
the common heritage clause of the Declaration of Principles.
A selection of such elucidatory glosses by leading United
States spokesmen with respect to the freedom of access (and so,
by necessary implication, to the Declaration of Principles and the
Moratorium Resolution) follows:
(1) Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger at the Hotel
Pierre, New York City on Thursday, April 8, 1976, before the
Foreign Policy Association, the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Association of the United States of America:
The conference has not yet approached agreement on the issue
of the deep seabeds because it has confronted serious
philosophical disagreements. Some have argued that commer~ial
exploration unrestrained by international treaty would be in the
best interests of the United States. In fact this country is many
years ahead of any other in the technology of deep sea mining,
and we are in all respects prepared to protect our interests. If
the deep seabeds are not subject to international agreement the
United States can and will proceed to explore and mine on its
own. 87
What the United States cannot accept is that the right of access to seabed minerals be limited exclusively to an international
authority or be so severely restricted as effectively to deny access to the firms of any individual nation, including our own. We
are gratified to note an increasing awareness of the need to
avoid such extreme positions and to move now to a genuine accommodation that would permit reasonable assurances to all
states and their nationals that their access to resources will not
be denied. 88

(2) Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger at a reception at
the United States Mission for the Heads of Delegations attending
the Fifth Session of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, New York, New York, September l, 1976:
With respect to the deep seabeds, we face two realities. One is
that developed countries - a few developed countries at this
moment-alone possess the technology with which to exploit the
87. Kissinger, The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation, in FOREIGN
POLICY ASSOCIATION, PRESENTATION OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER 3, 14 (1976).
88. Id. at 15.
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seabeds-why don't I use a more happy word?-to mine the
seabeds.
On the other hand, there is the concept that the deep
seabeds represent the common heritage of mankind and,
therefore, there is a certain conflict between the realities of the
capabilities of certain countries and the theoretical conviction of
many other countries.
From the point of view of those who possess the technology,
many of the proposals that have already been made represent
very significant concessions in the sense that they represent
self-imposed restrictions on what would otherwise be an
unrestricted freedom of action.
From the point of view of many of the developing countries
some of the these concessions, in view of their convictions, are
not considered concessions at all but tend to be taken for
granted. 89

(3) Statement in 1980 by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson,
then the United States President's Special Representative for the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, to Sanford H. Winston, Vice-President, National Association of Manufacturers Communications Department and member of the United
States Delegation to the Conference in 1978 and 1979, in an interview:
Richardson: There is nothing in international law to prevent
anyone from exploring or exploiting deep seabed resources as an
exercise of high seas freedoms. Only by ratifying a treaty in
force would a government agree to limit the exercise of those
rights. But it is no secret that our view of what is and is not permissible under international law is shared by precious few other
governments. Witness the repeated and strong statements on
the subject made at the Law of the Sea Conference and
elsewhere by spokesmen for the Group of 77, now representing
some 120 countries of the 158 that participate in the conference.
If, in the end, we are unable to negotiate the kind of seabed
regime we believe necessary to assure access, we will certainly
support the rights of U.S. citizens as we interpret them in international law. Just as certain is the fact that mining in the
absence of a treaty will produce challenge and conflict, at a
minimum in the legal and political forums available to the great
majority of countries that hold seabed resources to be inviolable.

89. Press Release USUN-90 (76) (Aug. 13, 1976).
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I firmly believe the stability afforded by a universally acclaimed,
equitable seabed mining regime is worth the pursuit. 90

(4) In additon to statements made by key individuals in the
Executive Branch of the Government with authority to reflect the
United States' position, the Congress too has gone on record with
its "findings and purposes", "intent" and instructions. It has unequivocally defined its position, inter alia, in the following affirmances:
(a)

"Findings and Purposes"
(i) "Findings"
(7) on December 17, 1970, the United States supported (by
affirmative vote) the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 27 49 (XXV) declaring inter alia the principle that the
mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of
mankind, with the expectation that this principle would be legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive international Law
of the Sea Treaty yet to be agreed upon:
(12) it is the legal opinion of the United States that exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources
of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas subject to a duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their
exercise of those and other freedoms of the high seas subject to a
duty of reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their
exercise of those and other freedoms recognized by general principles of international law. 91
(ii) "Purposes"
(2) pending the ratification by, and entering into force with
respect to, the United States of such a Treaty, to provide for
establishment of an international revenue-sharing fund the proceeds of which shall be used for sharing with the international
community pursuant to such Treaty;
(3) to establish, pending the ratification by, and entering
into force with respect to, the United States of such a Treaty, an
interim program to regulate the exploration for and commercial
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by United
States citizens; 92
90. Elliot L. Richardson on Deep Seabed Mining,
91. 30 U.S.C. § 140l(a).
92. 30 u.s.c. § 140l(b).
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"Intent" and instructions
It is the intent of Congress (1) that any international agreement to which the United
States becomes a party should, in addition to promoting other
national oceans objectives (A) provide assured and nondiscriminatory access,
under reasonable terms and conditions, to the hard
mineral resources of the deep seabed for United States
citizens, and
(B) provide security of tenure by recognizing the
rights of United States citizens who have undertaken exploration or commercial recovery under title I before
such agreement enters into force with respect to the
United States to continue their operations under terms,
conditions, and restrictions which do not impose significant new economic burdens upon such citizens with
respect to such operations with the effect of preventing
the continuation of such operations on a viable economic
basis;
(2) that the extent to which any such international agreement conforms to the provisions of paragraph (1) should be determined by the totality of the provisions of such agreement, including, but not limited to, the practical implications for the
security of investments of any discretionary powers granted to an
international regulatory body, the structures and decisionmaking
procedures of such body, the availability of impartial and effective
procedures for the settlement of disputes, and any features that
tend to discriminate against exploration and commercial recovery
activities undertaken by United States citizens .. .. 93

D.

EXPRESSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING BY SOME NON-U.S.
DELEGATIONS AND EMINENT PERSONS

(1) With regard to the Moratorium Resolution, the British Delegation explained its vote in the following terms, inter alia: "We do
not believe that the General Assembly can or should by its recommendations purport to modify existing international law." 94
(2) The Soviet Union, in the same forum, expressed the view
that: "[T]he operative part [of the Moratorium Resolution] is so
phrased that it can be interpreted as infringing the freedom of the
open seas sanctioned by international law." 95
93. 30 u.s.c. § 1441.
94. 24 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1709th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1709 (1969).
95. Id. at 17.
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(3) Mr. Amerasinghe, then the President of the Conference, and
a leader of the Group of 77, stated the following (and typically accurate) understanding of the Declaration of Principles:
The Declaration cannot claim the binding force of a treaty internationally negotiated and accepted, but it is a definite step in
that direction and no less than the other two Declarations that
have been adopted at this session, it has-if I may adapt the
words of Walt Whitman-that fervent element of moral authority that is more binding than treaties .... [W]e may assign varying degrees of significance and validity to the Declaration, but
we can all agree that its conspicuous merit is its daring originality and that its real virtue is its moral force. 96

(4) In the First Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Galindo
Pohl, Chairman of the Legal Subcommittee of the Seabeds Committee, and a very prominent member of the Group of 77's delegation, clearly viewed the Declaration of Principles as not qualifying
as "instant customary international law." 97 He pointed out that:
[T]hat draft is not and is not intended to be a provisional regime
governing the exploitation of the seabed. Thus we must
recognize that this understanding loomed large in all our
negotiations; it was accepted by all parties independent of the
positions they may have taken on the problems of maritime law.
Therefore, the declaration is a first step toward that regime, but
it is not yet the regime. 98

(5) The United Kingdom Delegation explained its affirmative
vote on the Declaration of Principles in terms of what it
characterized as a general reservation which it couched in the
following clear terms:
[L]ike any other resolution of the General Assembly, the draft
declaration has in itself no binding force. Secondly and arising
from this, it must be regarded as a whole and interpreted as a
whole; as a whole it has no dispositive effect until we have agreement on an international regime and, as part of that agreement,
we have a clear, precise and internationally accepted definition
of the area to which the regime is to apply. 99

(6) The Soviet Union, following its enduring policy of strongly
disapproving of any presumption of any attribution of legislative
96.
97.
98.
99.

25 U.N. GAOR c.l, (1933d mtg.) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1933 (1970).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781st mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1781 (1970).
25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1799th mtg.) at l, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1799 (1970).
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competence to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
pointed out: "Needless to say, adoption of the declaration by the
General Assembly cannot create legal consequences for States in
view of the well-known fact that decisions of the General
Assembly have simply the force of recommendations." 100
(7) Ambassador Galindo Pohl, who had a key role in the negotiations and drafting of the Declaration of Principles Resolution, explained, in the First Committee of the General Assembly when the
Resolution was being reviewed there prior to presentation to the
Plenary, the compromissory result of negotiations which led to the
favorable reception of the common heritage of mankind formula in
the General Assembly, as follows:
Nor does the draft declaration endorse or undermine the socalled moratorium that was the subject of a General Assembly
resolution at its twenty-fourth session. In the course of the
negotiations, conflicting interests were reconciled in the sense
that the declaration of principles would be neither of two things:
either a provisional regime or a restatement of the moratorium.
On these points the draft declaration reflects a clear desire to be
neutral. 101

E.

A RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW

(1) Theodore Kronmiller, in his book The Lawfulness of Deep
Seabed Mining, reinforces the foregoing isolated statements by
reporting more generally on the voting on the Declaration of Principles Resolution:
Clearly, views expressed concerning the meaning of the
common heritage of mankind evidenced a wide disparity of
opinions. It bears repeating that, although other operative provisions of the General Principles Resolution gave further content
to the concept, these provisions were also the subjects of greatly
differing interpretations. Following adoption of the Resolution,
other efforts were made to define the concept, but as will be seen
below, most of the gaps could not be bridged. 102

(2) Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee itself reported in 1968, on the
divergent positions of its members:
A very large number of members expressed the view that the
100. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1798th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1798 (1970).
101. 25 U.N. GAOR c.1 (1781th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781 (1970).
102. KRONMILLER, supra note 53, at 266.
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area beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction was not
susceptible of appropriation and that States could not exercise
national sovereignty over such an area. Other members noted
that there was a distinction between non-appropriation of the
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of present national
jurisdiction and the exploitation of these areas. 103

IV.

CONCLUSION

An important question remains: If the varying definitions of
the common heritage of mankind principle differ so fundamentally,
and if the United States had, over the years, unswervingly
adhered to the common pasture or common well analogy, how can
so many representatives of such a large number of countries have
ignored the reiterated statements by responsible American
representatives whose utterances were made both in the course of
the treaty-making process and in major policy pronouncements
about it? The answer may, sadly, be in the Delegation's conscientious pursuit of the ultimate chimera of the Conference, the
"Yesable Proposition." 104 (By a "yesable proposition" -which he
did not clearly define-Professor Fisher, its author, would appear
to have meant a concrete proposal which would at least minimally
satisfy the offeror while inducing his vis-a-vis to abandon his rejectionist posture and accept the offer.) Can such a proposition,
especially in the multi-faceted context of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, be found which could satisfy all
sides? A brief outline of that sort of discussion now can be put forward. The underlying assumption of this prescription is that
negotiators will always prefer to formulate their claims in clear
and precise language, that they will always seek compromise
rather than confrontation, and that a proposition can always be
found which could satisfy all sides. This assumption is a common
professional myopia of lawyers, and has been cogently commented
upon by the late Judge Charles de Visscher:
The man of law is naturally liable to misunderstand the
character of political tensions and the conflicts to which they
give rise. He is inclined to see in them only "the object of litigation"; to cast in terms of legal dialectic what is in the highest
degree of refractory to reasoning, to reduce to order what is
103. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction at 44, U.N. Doc. A/7230 (1968).
104. R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1969) (Chapter II is entitled

Give Them a Yesable Proposition).
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essentially unbridled dynamism, in a word to depoliticize what is
undiluted politics .... The most serious tensions are obviously
those where the stake is a new distribution of elements constituting the relative power of states such as territory ... [and]
raw materials. Here reason vainly searches for a criterion, coming to a dead stop before the historical individuality of the
State. 105

Indeed an analysis of the history of the United States Draft
for a United Nations Convention on the International Seabed
A rea 106 illustrates some of the difficulties involved with the
yesable proposition. In that draft document the United States
made an offer which at the time was thought by its sponsors to be
highly "yesable" by the Group of '17. No doubt, had the American
diplomacy been different, it might have been "yessed." But,
because the package put forward was seen by the Soviet Bloc and
the Group of 77 merely as America's first bid, it was given a barely polite reception. Those groups, in fact, were enabled to appraise
it as inviting forceful or claiming tactics. So now, sadly, that wellintended draft is a dead letter .107
The result of the mode of its presentation and of the advocacy
of this generous, honest and potentially effective document, had a
further deleterious effect. In the subsequent, long drawn-out
negotiations at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, the United States was forced into a defensive, even a
self-justificatory, if not self-deprecatory, posture after its draft was
unveiled, as if that offer were a dishonest claim to pre-empt the
world's resources on behalf of its own nationals. This characterization was far from the truth. The draft's proponents envisaged it as
the proposal of a disinterested ideal. It offered the blueprint for an
organization which was intended to develop a sharing of wealth,
an organ of international cooperation capable of augmenting
developmental aid, and a needed enhancement of the revenues of
the United Nations. Far from masking a grab at resources, the

c.

105.
DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (Corbett
trans. 1968).
106. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on International Seabed Areas, 9 l.L.M.
1046 (1970) [hereinafter cited as United States Draft].
107. For Cassandra-like forebodings in this regard, see Goldie, The United States

Draft for a United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area-A ''Polite Conversation," 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1971) (Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, United States
Draft].
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draft could only have been established at the expense of
diminishing the economic advantages of the United States' own
nationals and enterprises. Indeed, the fate of this testimony of
American goodwill poignantly and concretely reinforces Dr. Herman Kahn's criticism of Professor Fisher's book, where the former
said, in part:
In those situations in which there is not sufficient mutual interest to strike an acceptable bargain, the net thrust of Mr.
Fisher's insights is likely to give excessive and rather effective
ammunition to those urging concession and compromise. That is,
in many ways Mr. Fisher's recommendations can be used to
generate psychological pressures, arguments, and even
misleadingly seductive and seemingly neutral observations that
are actually recommendations for making concessions and compromises - or even more important, creating the conditions for
such concession and compromise. For this reason politicians, the
humanists, idealists, utopians and the amateur citizens are going
to find this book more sweepingly persuasive than many of the
ideologically committed or even some of the relatively hardheaded and tough-minded (in the William Jam es sense)
bargainers. 108

In following up this perceptive comment, it may be observed
that the experiences of the Western European and Other Group 109
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are
represented in the sketch on the dust jacket of Fisher's book. He
shows two fencers, one in the lunge, the other in the en garde
posture. The former's attention is distracted by a carrot on the latter's rapier. (The yesable proposition?) But what if our lunging
duelist rejects the Fisher horoscopy of his reaction and, instead,
remembers elementary economics lessons about satisfaction deferred? If he does not allow himself to be tempted or deflected by one
108. FISHER, supra note 104, reviewed by H. Kahn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1969, § 7 (book
reviews), at 72-73.
109. The "Western European and Other Group" is one of five political caucus groups in
the General Assembly. These groups have semi-official recognition, especially in the terms
of memberships at committees and bureaux. (Thus the bureaux are always five in number to
accomodate each Group.) The Other Groups are: The Eastern European Group, the Asian
Group, the African Group, and the Latin American Group. The term "Other" of the
"Western European and Other Group" is intended to indicate the membership of such countries as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc. which caucus with the
Western European nations but which, obviously, are not geographically part of that divided
continent.
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carrot, how many more may be the reward of aggressive
behavior? 11° Furthermore, what if his intention is not to formulate
specific demands in terms of a legal dialectic and as objects of
litigation but to create a situation of unbridled dynamism in order
to bring about "a new distribution of elements constituting the
relative power of states such as . . . raw materials," 111 or to
achieve, in the language of the champions of the New International Economic Order, "the transference of wealth and power to
the countries of the developing world?" 112
As a result of its misconception of many of the premises of
negotiation in a revolutionary, dynamic situation, the Fisher
"yesable proposition" has proved to be a way of losing, not gaining, diplomatic goals. By heightening expectations and placing a
premium, in fact, although not in intention, on encouraging those
who claim to try upping the ante, the proposition offers selfdefeating advice. The "yesable proposition" can thus be seen as
creating dilemmas for the original offeror. It can also provide a potent means of straining international friendships, through
misunderstandings and future claims, as the Law of the Sea
negotiations also testify. Indeed, the United States' good natured
and well-intended search for a "yesable proposition" at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has led to much
of the hesitant and tentative "yes, but ..." diplomacy which was
an unhappy characteristic of the U.S. Delegation's bargaining with
the more tough-minded representatives at the Conference. Our
diplomats were looking for the precisely formulated compromissory solutions of the man of law in a context of unbridled
dynamism. In such an arena, the contention will always be, as it
always has been, between competing ideologies. It continually
states contests in which one contender's approach is that of the
relative will power of states, while the man of law is under the
disadvantage of seeking to formulate a logical, equitable, and
legalistic distribution of resources. The basic error of the U.S.
Delegation has been to mistake for legal, and therefore rationally
arguable differences, what in reality are "questions of power and
tests of one's nerves and strength." 113
110. In large part it was the expectations for that diplomatic scenario that led to this
writer's skepticism back in 1971. See Goldie, United States Draft, supra note 107, at 123-33.
111. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 105 and the accompanying text.
112. See e.g., R. MEAGHER, supra note 17, passim.
113. DE VISSCHER, supra note 105, at 79.
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Befogged and bedevilled by its earnest search for that everreceding will-o'-the-wisp, the U.S. Delegation seemed to give an intended appearance of divided counsels and of bewildered complaisance. Such a manifestation of good-natured indecision may
well have encouraged determined supporters of the res publicae
definition of the common heritage into believing that their campaign to dissuade the United States from its earlier support of the
common well or common pasture definition was on the brink of victory. Unhappily, the closer the Delegation appeared to be shuffling towards an acceptance of the res publicae interpretation, the
more the gulf widened between what it and what Congress and
the White House could accept. The Congress and the President increasingly insisted upon the stipulations set forth in Section 201 of
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, or
equivalent policies. The 1980 Act, for example, expresses the intention of Congress that any agreement to which the United
States might become a party should provide for the enjoyment by
U.S. citizens and enterprises of: (1) the right of assured and nondiscriminatory access to the deep seabed hard minerals
resources; 114 (2) security of tenure when their rights have accrued
prior to the Treaty's entry into force with respect to the United
States; 115 (3) the privilege of continued exploration and recovery
activities to the maximum extent practicable 116 consistent with the
Treaty; and (4) the protection of their interim investment. 117
Despite possible mystification due to the Delegation's
fruitless but sincere pursuit of the yesable proposition, the final arbiters of policy and authoritative speakers for the United States
hewed unswervingly to the interpretation of the common heritage
of mankind which this country had when the long trail of
negotiating began. Unhappily, however, the Delegation's
chimerical pursuit of the Fisher Prescription appeared to encourage some Group of 77 representatives to entertain overly
sanguine under-estimations of the United States' firm adhesion to
its often repeated declarations. Thus the impossible quest tended
to blur, while it never cancelled, the reality of this country's commitment to her original position. The diplomacy which led to this

114.
115.
116.
117.

30 U.S.C. § 1441(1)(A).
30 U.S.C. § 1441(1)(B).
30 u.s.c. § 1442.
30 u.s.c. § 1443.
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obfuscation can be contrasted with the approach which
Talleyrand, that master of equivocation, credited the Duke of
Wellington with and identified as the basis of the latter's great
success at the Congress of Vienna:
He [the Duke of Wellington] never indulged in that parade of
mystification which is generally employed by Ambassadors:
watchfulness, prudence and experience of human nature were
the only means he employed; and it is not surprising that, by the
use of these simple agencies, he acquired great influence. 118

118. GRONOW, THE REMINISCENCES AND RECOLLECTIONS OF CAPTAIN GRONOW 374 (Raymond ed . 1964), quoted in 1 E. LONGFORD, WELLINGTON, THE YEARS OF THE SWORD 382 (1969).
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APPENDIX
Letter dated 24 November 1970 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction addressed to the
Chairman of the First Committee*
QUESTION OF THE RESERVATION EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF
THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR, AND
THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, UNDERLYING THE
HIGH SEAS BEYOND THE LIMITS OF PRESENT NATIONAL JURISDICTION, AND THE
USE OF THEIR RESOURCES IN THE INTERESTS OF MANKIND: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF
THE SEA~ED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL
JURISDICTION.
As you know, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National J urisdiction was unable at its sessions in 1970 to report agreement on a
declaration of principles for presentation to the General Assembly
at its twenty-fifth session in accordance with operative paragraph
4 of resolution 257 4 B (XXIV). After consulting and obtaining the
concurrence of the Chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, and members of
the Committee, I undertook informal consultations with members
of the Committee in an effort to prepare a draft Declaration that
would command general support.
As a result of these consultations, a draft Declaration has
emerged which, in my opinion, reflects the highest degree of
agreement attainable at the present time. It does not, however,
represent a consensus of all the members of the Committee.
Having taken into consideration the views of the members of
the Committee, I now have the honour to bring to your attention
the text annexed hereto, which represents a compromise
commanding wide support among the members of the Committee.
*

U.N. Doc. A/c.1/L. 542 (November 25, 1970) (issued in mimeographed form only).
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Some delegations expressed their reservations as to the
substance of the draft Declaration and the aforementioned procedure, and urged that, considering the lack of a consensus among
members of the Committee on the draft Declaration, consultations
be continued with a view to reaching wider agreement on the text.
I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate this letter
and the attached text as a document of the First Committee for
the information of its members.
(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE

Chairman
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction
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